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Recent surveys report the increasing number of muddy ﬂows in many areas, and point
out the fact that agricultural practices (among others) inﬂuence signiﬁcantly the risk
and severity of muddy ﬂows. In this paper, we investigate the economic incentives that
can be given to the farmer to adopt diﬀerent practices. We propose an original economic
instrument that entails an ‘ambient tax’, voluntary revelations and a compensation fund.
Because of the authorities’ diﬃculties to be informed of each farmer’s individual eﬀorts,
the tax cannot depend on the individual but on the collective level of eﬀorts. However,
each agent may lower his tax payment by revealing his individual eﬀorts to the regulator
so that high eﬀorts may be rewarded compared to low ones. The tax revenue is used to
supply a fund that is dedicated to the compensation of victims if a muddy ﬂow occurs.
hence it is possible to simultaneously increase the incentives for farmers to adopt more
environmentally friendly practices and to improve the compensation of victims without
mitigating their incentives to protect themselves against the risk of muddy ﬂow.
Key Words: muddy ﬂow, natural disasters, economic incentives, ambient tax, in-
surance, compensation fund.
JEL: G22, H21, H23, H3, Q2, Q541 Introduction
T h i sp a p e ra i m sa tc o n s i d e r i n gt h ee c o n o m i ci s s u eo fm u d d yﬂow risks. We propose to
explore the speciﬁcities of such risks and to present some ”pistes” that could be followed
in order to mitigate them. All stakeholders are involved at diﬀerent steps in the decision
process and our discussion is never deconnected from the physical aspects related to
muddy ﬂows. In particular, not only the farmers, but also the inhabitants, take part in
a compensation fund, which characteristics and properties will be analyzed.
Muddy ﬂows1 have been the subject of many studies in diﬀerent disciplines (agron-
omy, hydrology, morphology, physical, geography, ...). Concerning the physical processes
and the climatic aspects, much is done to understand how and why they occur. In partic-
ular, one important aspect of muddy ﬂows deals with the role played by the agricultural
p r a c t i c e sa n dw i t ht h ee ﬃciency of some practices in the mitigation of muddy ﬂow risks.
Recent surveys report the increasing number of muddy ﬂows in many areas, and point
out the fact that those problems are not only due to natural events, but also to land
occupation and human activities (see for example the report by the French Ministry
of Environment and Agriculture, 1996). Both agricultural and domestic activities play
an important role in the occurrence of muddy ﬂows by aﬀecting topography and soil,
and suppressing various types of ‘buﬀer zones’ such as hedges, ditches, water bodies,
wetlands, forests, ﬁelds. Many studies have been carried out on the agricultural prac-
tices and their respective eﬃciency on soil hydrology and mechanics, and it seems that
some of them are better than others (no tillage, double drilling of small grains, ...) to
limit soil detachment. Even though all complex aspects of muddy ﬂow are not yet well
understood, implementing cropping systems that induce less risk of runoﬀ and soil ero-
sion becomes urgent. Because of a lack of information, of communication between the
diﬀerent groups interacting together (scientists with decisionmakers, farmers with de-
1See Auzet, Boiﬃn, Papy, Maucorps, and Ouvry (1990), Helming, Auzet, and Favis-Morlock (2005)
and Auzet, Heitz, Armand, Guyonnet, and Moquet (2005) for a detailed description of this phenomenon,
Boardman and Poesen (2006) for erosion soil in Europe and Auzet, Bissonnais, and Souchère (2006) for
speciﬁc insights about the french issue.
1cisionmakers, farmers with farmers, ...), such implementations may fail to work. Then
analyses of the sociologic relations between the individuals or the groups of individuals
may help to emphasize and to understand the locking points2.
Cost-beneﬁt analyses are also carried out in order to evaluate the social cost of
muddy ﬂow, taking into account not only claims of the inhabitants of a damaged area,
but also the loss of intrinsic value of ground when soils are detached and transported
from the lands to the roads or dirt tracks (for recent works see for instance Kuhlman,
2006 and Happe, Damgaard, Osuch, Sattler, Zander, Uthes, Schuler, and Piorr, 2006).
Knowing all this information about cost, beneﬁt, networks, characteristics of farms,
soils, and so on, the aim of the economic instrument is to “convince” farmers to change
their practices. However, because any change in individual practices that improves the
social welfare may create some distortions at the individual level, the agent may not be
willing to change his practices or his technology without either being compelled or having
suﬃcient incentives to do so. In the context of muddy ﬂow and, more generally, when
dealing with environmental risks, even a harch legislation does not permit a regulator to
compell agents to opt for the “right” behavior especially because he cannot observe all
the actions decided by the agents. The work of the economist is therefore to build some
economic instruments that create such incentives without the need of full information
about individual actions.
Eﬃcient tools must be such that modiﬁcations in the practices be valuable for both
the farmers and the citizens, in the short term but also and especially in the long term.
About this point it is often believed that subsidies are the best way to deal with tech-
nology change. Moreover, it is often thought that subsidies should be put in place
indeﬁnitely, otherwise one might observe a surrender of the new practices because of a
lack of ﬁnancial support. Unfortunately, from a ﬁnancial point of view it is too costly to
sustain such a policy for a long time.
2In this spirit, sociology is becoming a signiﬁcative cornerstone in the comprehension and the miti-
gation of muddy ﬂow risks through the work done on the functioning of the involved networks. See for
instance Fry (2005) and Mathieu and Joannon (2005).
2One point we want show is that subsidies are not the sole instrument that may
be implement in the agricultural sphere and, most importantly, that economic tools
(including subsidies) should not be systematically seen as very long term, and then very
costly, solutions. To do so, we choose to deal with the normative approach of economics:
we are focusing on “what is the best” knowing the diﬀerent constraints. In this approach
we diﬀer from the economic studies that consider the Coase (1960) conjecture related to
property rights and the transaction costs related to the relations between the regulator
and the farmer. We are focusing on the polluter-pay principle formally established at the
international level in 1972 by the OECD. A straight application of this principle often
leads to the implementations of taxes on goods, production or practices that deteriorate
the environment. But, for reasons detailed below, standard taxes are not the good way
to limit muddy ﬂow risks, and a more ﬂexible regulatory policy will be proposed.
Before going further in the introduction, let us tell a word about the elements that
economics take into account when deﬁning risk, and especially muddy ﬂow risks. As
in other disciplines, the frequence of occurrence of an event and also the consequences
it induces are among the most important elements in random processes. Nevertheless,
when dealing with events that may concern simultaneously a large population (natural
hazards, technological accidents, ...), the degree of correlation between the risks borne
by the individuals is also an essential element because it impacts the eﬃciency of the risk
mitigation policy to be implemented. Indeed, risk diversiﬁcation over a large population
no longer matters if everybody is harmed at a same date and by an identical event.
Individual motivations to invest in protection and/or prevention measures also depend
on wether the individual is alone to suﬀer a damage or if he belongs to an harmed
population. Muddy ﬂow risks belong to this category, with high correlation between the
agents. Even if their ﬁnancial consequences are, often, not so huge as those observed
for some large-scale risks (eartchquake risks for instance), they are considered by the
economists as no standard risks and, thus, they cannot be studied such as classical risks
(house, car, domestic risks, ...).
3In this paper, we are considering ex ante risk mitigation and ex post compensation.
As p e c i ﬁc economic instrument is investigated: the ambient tax. This instrument ﬁrst
appears in the economic literature in Segerson’s (1988) work and consists in ﬁxing a
tax no longer based on individual emissions of pollutant (which are often diﬃcult to
be known by a regulator) but with respect to the ambient level of pollution in the
aﬀected area (a lake, a river, the groundwater, the air, ...). We discuss the usefulness
of such a tool in the frame of risk rather than of pollution. Our aim is to propose an
environmental policy that gives farmers suﬃcient incentives to change their practices
and also to inhabitants to protect their goods and themselves against muddy ﬂows. This
policy is based on an ambient tax to which we add the possibility for the farmer to reveal
some information about his own practices and,b yd o i n gs o ,t ob ee x e m p t e df r o m ,a tl e a s t
part of, the ambient tax. Such an instrument has several positive characteristics and
seems to be an eﬃcient way to deal with diﬀuse pollution in a sense that we will precise
in the text. Still we explain which adaptations should be made in order to adapt it to the
muddy ﬂow issue and we also focus on experimental economics. This investigation ﬁeld is
rather recent in economics and allows to test, under speciﬁc conditions, the predictions of
economic (mostly game theoretic) models. In particular, experimental economics enables
us to test the eﬃciency of some economic tools before they are implemented in practice.
This is especially useful when no empirical data are available, which is the case for new
instruments.
In the economic literature, the ‘double dividend conjecture’ states that Society may
beneﬁt twice from an environmental policy based on taxes. First, taxes induce more
internalization of the risk of pollution by the agents and give them some incentives to re-
duce it and, second, taxes can increase the revenue of some agents by being redistributed
within the sector concerned by the environmental policy. In the second part of this work,
we focus on coverage aspects and we are to some extent rather close to this conjecture.
Indeed we analyze the characteristics of a compensation fund that would be supplied
with the ambient tax and devoted to the compensation of victims of muddy ﬂows. Such
4a system is interesting owing to the fact that victims are directly compensated by the
agents the activities of which, combined with speciﬁc climatic conditions, have generated
t h ed a m a g ea n d ,a sw ew i l le x p l a i ni ti nt h ep a p e r ,i tp r o v i d e ss o m er i s km u t u a l i z a t i o n
to the farmers. Moreover, the level of the available funds are directly connected to the
magnitude of the risk of muddy ﬂow.
While our reﬂexion was being constructed, many discussions took place with re-
searchers from other disciplines in agronomy, hydrology and morphology, geography,
sociology and history of sciences. This allowed us to bring our theoretical reﬂexions face
to face with empirical and physical facts as often as possible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical insights of the
ambient tax and, then, it discusses the role that experimental economics play in eval-
uating its economic eﬃciency. Section 3 deals with the compensation of victims after
the realization of a muddy ﬂow risk. The characteristics of such a risk and its diﬀer-
ence compared to other large risks are presented. Then we propose a new management
mechanism that entails an ambient tax, voluntary revelations and a compensation fund.
We show how it is possible to simultanously increase the incentives for farmers to adopt
more environmentally friendly practices and improve the compensation of victims with-
out mitigating their incentives to protect themselves against the risk of muddy ﬂow.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The ambient tax mechanism: Theoretical aspects
and empirical insights
In this section we ﬁrst discuss the type of policy scheme that should be used to address
the muddy ﬂow issue and suggest resorting to an ambient tax mechanism, which was
initially developed to handle the NonPoint Source Pollution (NPSP) issue. Second, we
compare the NPSP and the muddy ﬂow issues in order to see how the ambient tax
scheme could be adapted to the latter setting. Finally, we present brieﬂyt h em a n y
5experimental studies that have been carried out to investigate the practical eﬃciency of
the instrument.
2.1 Theoretical aspects
Our goal is to induce the agents whose activities have an impact on the occurrence of
muddy ﬂows to adopt better practices. A straightforward way to provide such incentives
is to reward good practices through subsidies and punish bad practices through taxes.
However that kind of regulation (which is directly related to the traditional ‘pigovian’
taxation ﬁrst proposed by Pigou in 1920) is likely to be too costly to be applied to the
muddy ﬂow issue. Indeed, it requires the regulator to observe all the practices that
have an impact on muddy ﬂows. However, many of the agents’ practices are likely to
be diﬃcult–if not impossible–to be monitored by the regulator at a reasonable cost.
For example, while it may be easy to observe the type of crop in a ﬁeld, or the area
of cultivated land, it is less easy to observe a farmer’s tillage practices or his way of
fertilization.
2.1.1 Similarity with the NonPoint Source Pollution (NPSP) issue
A very similar problem occurs in the ﬁeld of NonPoint Source Pollution (NPSP), which is
as p e c i ﬁc type of pollution where the regulator’s information is restricted. The pollution
of a speciﬁc area (e.g. a lake) is typically said to be nonpoint if the polluters’ individual
emissions that generate this pollution are fully or partially unobservable by the regula-
tor at a reasonable cost (see among others Tomasi, Braden and Segerson, 1994). For
instance, pollution of the ground water by nitrates is a NPSP issue. NPSP is deﬁned in
opposition to Point Source Pollution, in which polluters and their emissions are known.
The concentration of pollution in the aﬀected area is called the ‘ambient pollution’ level.
This lack of observability of polluters’ emissions stems from several causes. Pollutants
follow indirect and diﬀuse pathways from the sources to the environmental recipients
(air, water or soils) and their fate is highly dependent on weather conditions. Discharg-
6ers are numerous and often of small size3 (households, farms, ...). Sometimes they are
even mobile, (e.g. cars in urban areas). Because of these unability to observe perfectly
each polluter’s individual emission, traditional environmental policies aimed at regulat-
ing individual emissions cannot be used to address NPSP questions. Then one must seek
other observable elements on which to base regulations.
The most straightforward candidates for regulation are the ‘inputs’, i.e. all the factors
that a ﬁrm uses to produce. They are taken in a very wide sense, including both material
inputs like the machines, buildings, factories, ﬁelds, labour, energy, etc. as well as
immaterial inputs like practices or technologies. Hence a ﬁrst possibility would be to
control input use by introducing ‘input taxes’ on those inputs which increase pollution,
and ‘input subsidies’ on those inputs which reduce pollution (Griﬃn and Bromley, 1982,
Shortle and Dunn, 1986, Shortle and Abler, 1994). However, as pointed out by Braden
and Segerson (1993), the instruments requires the regulator to be able to monitor all the
inputs that have an impact on pollution, which is obviously likely to be too costly. Thus
we are back again to the point of imperfect information.
Finally the similarity between the muddy ﬂow and the NPSP issue appears clearly:
• A muddy ﬂow harms some agents and is (at least partially) caused by some other
agents’ bad practices, though the latter do not pay for this damage. This ‘negative
externality’ suﬀered by some economic agents justiﬁes some intervention by other
agents (not systematically the State) to regulate the situation.
• Many types of practices may have an impact on the occurrence and severity of the
3Examples of NPSP can be mostly found in domestic and agricultural areas. Large quantities of
fertilizers (containing nitrogen) are spread out in ﬁelds for higher yields. Nitrogen is partly absorbed
by crops but is partially transported away to surface or ground waters, or it can evaporate into the at-
mosphere. Pathways are complex and aﬀected by the nature of the soil, topography, weather conditions,
etc. An exhaustive observation of all those elements is virtually impossible. Furthermore, individual
emissions not only depend on those ‘natural’ parameters, but also on the polluters’ practices. For in-
stance, nitrogen leaching can be more or less important according to the period of spreading. Polluters’
practices are clearly diﬃcult to monitor.
7ﬂow, some of them being especially diﬃcult to monitor by the regulator. Moreover,
as NPSP, muddy ﬂows are due to the conjonction of several agents’ activities, so
that it is hard for the regulator to separate the responsibilities of each of them.
Hence he cannot resort to an individual regulation of practices without having to
carry out expensive individual audits.
• Random factors such as weather conditions have a signiﬁcant impact on muddy
ﬂows, just as in NPSP problems.
2.1.2 The usefulness of an ambient tax
To adress the NPSP issue, economists have developed a speciﬁc policy scheme. Since
individual actions are diﬃc u l ta n dc o s t l yt ob eo b s e r v e da n dd r a w i n go nt h ea d v a n c e si n
agency theory applied to teams (see Holmström, 1982), Segerson (1988) and Xepapadeas
(1991) suggest to use the ambient level of pollution as a consistent basis for the tax4.
Since the ambient pollution level depends on the individual emissions, such a tax is
able to induce each polluter to choose the actions that will decrease this level throuh
individual emission reduction.
Our claim here is that a variant of such a policy scheme can be relevant for the
regulation of muddy ﬂows. Instead of trying to directly observe and control the agents’
practices, the regulator should introduce a tax scheme based on the results of their
practices, i.e. the environmental quality, and more precisely here the damages generated
by a muddy ﬂow. Such a policy scheme should induce each agent to improve his practices
because by doing so he reduces the risk of being liable for a large tax. Of course this
policy instrument requires the regulator to be able to provide an economic assessment
of the damage due to a muddy ﬂow. It should be noticed that to date such economic
assessments are usually not carried out or are not carried out with suﬃcient care.
4Hansen (1998) and Horan, Shortle, and Abler (1998) propose taxing the damage generated by
ambient pollution, but the principle of their schemes remains the same in a general setting.
82.1.3 Interaction, rationality and complete information
An ambient tax is a collective m e c h a n i s m ,t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h et a xa na g e n th a s
to pay not only depends on his own practices, but also the others’ practices since the
damage also depends on the others’ eﬀorts. This implies that when making his decisions,
an agent has to take into account what it believes the others will do5. The polluters’
decisions are now interdependent, or put diﬀerently, the agents are in a game as deﬁned
by game theory. In such a game, it is generally assumed that rational agents choose
their welfare-maximizing decisions given the information they have on others and on
their environment. Based on that assumption, game theory is able to propose diﬀerent
solution concepts, i.e. to give reasonable predictions to rational agents’ decisions. One
of the most general solution concept is the so-called Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). The
agents’ decisions form such an equilibrium when each agent’s decision is individually
optimal given the other agents’ decisions. Put diﬀerently, in a Nash equilibrium, no
agent has any incentive to unilaterally change his decision. Since the regulator can
compute this equilibrium, he is able to calibrate the tax so that at the equilibrium,
each polluter makes the decisions that are socially desirable. A necessary condition for
this is that the regulator provides agents with complete information,t h a ti s ,w i t ha l l
the information they need to make optimal decisions. In particular, an agent should be
informed of all the other agents’ characteristics (i.e. the cost of their eﬀorts to adopt
better practices) in order to be able to anticipate their decisions. Furthermore, an agent
should know the impact of his decisions on the environmental quality in order to be able
to evaluate the impact of his decisions on the level of the tax (such informations should
be at least partially provided by scientiﬁci n v e s t i g a t i o n sa n dd i s c l o s e dt ot h ea g e n t sv i a
the regulator). Hence, if agents behave rationally and have complete information, the
instrument should be eﬃcient.
5For example, if a polluter thinks that the others will not emit much, then he may anticipate that
the ambient pollution level will be low so that the level of the tax will be low as well, therefore he might
aﬀord to emit more. But the impact of such a behavior can be counterbalanced by a reputation eﬀect.
We will come back to this argument later on in the paper.
9The assumptions of rationality and complete information from the agent’s side are
not as strong as they seem to be at ﬁrst glance. It is true that rationality is never perfect
in the real world, to the extent that errors are possible. However, errors may not be
systematic and therefore cancel out on average. The assumption of complete information
seems plausible if polluters are located in a small area, know and can monitor each other,
and can possibly communicate (e.g. farmers in a small region). This points is strongly
linked to scale considerations, which are discussed in Section 3. Actually, rationality
and complete information might be rather reasonable assumptions when dealing with
the muddy ﬂow issue. Even so, several authors (i.e. Hansen, 1998 and Horan, Shortle,
and Abler, 1998) have expressed skepticism about their validity and pointed out the
necessity of empirical studies. Many such studies have been carried out thereafter in
order to address these worries. But before presenting them in subsection 2.3, let us show
in the next subsection how the ambient tax mechanism can be adapted to the muddy
ﬂow context.
2.2 Adaptation of the ambient tax to the muddy ﬂow setting
There are some diﬀerences between the muddy ﬂows and NPSP problems, justifying an
adaptation of the ambient tax accordingly to the following points:
• Contrary to non-accidental and diﬀuse pollution, muddy ﬂows occur at some ran-
dom dates and not during a given period, which suggests that the regulator should
choose between two kinds of tax schemes. If he wants the tax payment to occur at
ﬁxed dates then, when evaluating the level of tax payment, he cannot wait until a
muddy ﬂow occurs. Thus a possibility is to assess the probability and damage of
the ﬂow for the forthcoming period and to introduce a tax based on the expected
damage of the ﬂow. On the contrary, if the regulator wants the tax payment to be
directly related to the real damages of a particular ﬂow, then the tax can only be
levied after a ﬂow has occured. In this case, the ambient tax mechanism applied
to muddy ﬂows might be regarded more as a penalty than as a tax system. Be-
10cause of the randomness of the muddy ﬂow events, tax payments will be random as
well, so that risk-preferences are likely to play a signiﬁcant role. Indeed, if agents
are risk-averse6, they will not react similarly, depending on the “riskyness” of the
environmental policy they have to follow.
• Muddy ﬂows often give rise to very important damages, and are often regarded
as ‘natural disasters’7. This implies that the level of the tax may reach very high
levels in some cases if it is evaluated ex post on the basis of the real damage.
A n di tm a yg i v er i s et ot h eb a n k r u p t c yo fs o m ea g e n t st h a ta r el i a b l ef o rt h et a x .
That problem was already recognized in the NPSP situation, but it is likely to
be even more serious here. The solution is typically to diminish the level of the
tax payment by a lump-sum (i.e. ﬁxed) amount (it is sometimes said that the
ambient tax is combined with a lump-sum subsidy). Since that amount is ﬁxed, it
is well-established that it does not change the incentives from an economic point
of view and the instrument remains eﬃcient. Of course, if the ﬁxed amount is very
high, the agents may even actually earn a subsidy instead of paying a tax if the
damage is small. Together with the argument related to risk smoothing, this point
is ﬁnally an argument in favor of a tax that is implemented ex ante, on the basis
of the level of risk.
• Responsibilities are often shared among various types of agents, such as the local
or national authorities (who are responsible for the location of buildings and the
construction of roads), ﬁrms, farms and also citizens. Farmers are generally recog-
nized as having large responsibilities in the occurrence of the ﬂows, so that they
should be liable for the ambient tax. However, they should not be the sole payers
since the level of the damage is also due to the citizens decisions. This argument
6An agent is risk averse in an economic sense if he is willing to pay to obtain the mean gain (or loss)
of a given situation without any possible ﬂuctuation around this mean value.
7In France, villages or towns having suﬀered a muddy ﬂow event have the possibility to obtain the
natuaral disaster state (’Etat de catastrophe naturelle’) thanks to a decree. If the decree is adopted, then
victims beneﬁt from the solidar, and compulsory, compensation programme related to natural hazards.
11is formalized in Section 4.
The latter two points emphasize the acceptability issue that can be associated with
the implementation of an ambient tax for the regulation of muddy ﬂows, and they point
out the diﬃculty of implementing a crude ambient tax. Acceptability issues have already
long been discussed in the ﬁe l do fN P S P ,b u tt h e ya r el i k e l yt ob ee v e nm o r ei m p o r t a n t
in the muddy ﬂow setting.
Another possibility to address the acceptability problem is to introduce instruments
that are less dependent on the collective eﬀort and more dependent on individual eﬀorts.
This can be done by giving the agents the opportunity to reveal their eﬀorts, and then
checking the revelations through individual inspections. As said previously, the regula-
tor cannot carry out systematic individual monitoring because it would be too costly.
However, it is well known since Becker (1968) that random inspections are suﬃcient to
provide correct incentives: lower inspection probabilities can be substituted by higher
tax payments. Xepapadeas (1995) and Kritikos (2004) suggest using such random audits
along with ambient-based schemes.
We suggest amending the ambient tax mechanism in the spirit of those speciﬁc
schemes. Hence the mechanism that we propose in Paragraph 3.2. uses the reputa-
tion eﬀects that may arise in small groups in order to create suﬃcient incentives for an
agent to behave in adequation with the environmental recommandations. Moreover, by
investing in new practices, the farmer will be able to signal himself to the authorities in
order to beneﬁt from a reduction in the ambient tax.
To summarize, an ambient-based tax mechanism is likely to be eﬃcient in mitigating
the muddy ﬂow problems. However, since our point was essentially theoretical until now,
a legitimate worry is the actual eﬃciency of such an instrument in the real world. Again,
we have good reasons to be optimistic in that respect as well thanks to the numerous
experimental studies that have been carried out in order to test the performance of the
scheme in the NPSP context. This is what we detail in the next subsection.
122.3 Laboratory experiments
To our knowledge, ambient-based schemes have rarely been implemented in the ﬁeld
yet.8 This means that very few real data are available to assess the practical eﬃciency
of the instrument. Besides, even if the instrument had already often been introduced
in the real world, data might have been diﬃcult to collect or to interpret. Such as in
experimental sciences, economists have overcome the obstacles inherent in the use of real
world data by collecting data in a controlled environment, i.e. the laboratory.9 There
are three reasons for using experimental economics (Shogren, 2004): to test theory, to
look for patterns of behaviour and to use the lab as a testbed for economic design. Thus
it allows us to build new mechanism designs and to test their eﬃciency.
Concerning ambient tax mechanisms, several experimental tests have been carried
out to provide insights on its practical eﬃciency in the NPSP setting.
All those experimental studies adopt the following standard methodology. Upon
arriving in the lab, each subject has ﬁrst to read detailed instructions describing the
decisions he has to make during the experiment. At the end of the experiment, each
subject receives a cash payment which depends on his performance during the session.
Performance-based payments are often preferred to lump-sum payments because they are
usually regarded as providing better incentives: they directly depend on the subject’s
decision.
An experimental session is composed of several periods (typically between 10 and
40 periods). Subjects play the role of ﬁrms which emit pollution. It should be noticed
however that most experiments are non-contextualized, which means that they use a
neutral terminology. For example, subjects are not told that they play the role of ﬁrms
that emit pollution. Neutral words are used instead, such as subjects instead of ﬁrms,
tokens instead of units of pollution, payoﬀ instead of proﬁt. While this practice may look
8An exception is presented in Ribaudo, Horan, and Smith (1999).
9The ﬁrst experimental economic works begun in the early 1950s. For a presentation of the standard
methodology and the main domains of application, see for example Davis and Holt (1993), and Kagel
and Roth (1995).
13queer to non-specialists, it is often preferred by experimenters because it allows drawing
more general conclusions from experiments, and it avoids confusing the subjects who
focus only on the monetary incentives and not on the speciﬁcc o n t e x tt h a tw o u l db e
suggested. However there are also arguments in favor of contextualization, depending on
the problem at hand. Contextualization can be particularly consistent with our study
on the muddy ﬂow issue, where reputation and personal feelings about the environment
aﬀect the preferences of the agent. Actually ‘ﬁeld experiments’, which resort to contex-
tualization and ‘real’ agents, are now emerging in experimental economics. They must
be considered as a suitable way to deal with the test of the ambient tax eﬃciency in
the context of muddy ﬂows. Furthermore, unless otherwise stated, no communication is
allowed among subjects. They are isolated from each other in partitions, so that they
cannot see or hear each other. The only information the subjects get on what the oth-
ers do is the sum of their invested tokens (sum of their emissions) at the end of each
period. Avoiding direct communication allows the experimenter to get more control on
the reasons why subjects are making their decisions. Communication can be introduced
in the lab, but this should be done carefully to avoid losing too much control. For exam-
ple, direct verbal communication can lead to psychological eﬀects such as intimidation,
seduction, etc. that the experimenter might not be aware of. However, it should be
noticed that introducing communication can be relevant still in some studies (such as
ours) to the extent that polluters are likely to know each other and meet frequently in
the real world.
Several variants of the ambient tax have been tested in the lab, and a detailed de-
scription of all the collected results is beyond the scope of this paper. We shall focus
here on the important following result :
Ambient taxes induce a level of ambient pollution close to the level desired by the reg-
ulator in charge of maximizing the social welfare10. Nevertheless, this level is achieved at
10In a Society composed of farmers and inhabitants, the social welfare encompasses the proﬁto ft h e
farmers plus the wealth of the inhabitants. If more agents are present (like lenders, ...), then their
wealth are also considered in the social welfare.
14a cost which might not be the lowest possible one. Indeed the highest emission reductions
are not always observed in more cost-eﬀective ﬁrms, i.e. those ﬁrms in which abatement
is the least costly.
This general result has been obtained in several studies (Cochard, Ziegelmeyer and
Bounmy, 2005, Cochard, Willinger and Xepapadeas, 2005, Alpizar, Requate and Schram,
2004, Poe, Schulze, Segerson and Vossler, 2004, Camacho and Requate, 2004 and Vossler,
Poe, Segerson and Schulze, 2002), and was further found to be robust to the introduction
of randomness into the ambient pollution function (Spraggon, 2002), which reﬂects nat-
ural variability (weather conditions). Translating this test into the muddy ﬂow setting,
it suggests that the inherent randomness of a muddy ﬂow event should not decrease the
eﬃciency of the ambient tax.
Nevertheless the instrument has been found to be signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient when
subjects have diﬀerent cost functions (Spraggon, 2004). Such an heterogeneity is of
course likely to be present in the real world, and Spraggon expected that it would reduce
the eﬃciency of the instrument because it makes the decisions of the subjects more
diﬃcult to make. Indeed, remember that when an ambient tax is implemented, subjects
have to anticipate what the others will do to take their own decisions; obviously that task
is more complex if the others have diﬀerent characteristics than them, even though those
characteristics are known. This problem might also occur in the muddy ﬂow context if
agents have heterogenous characteristics. Still there the scale issue is important, and the
degree of homogeneity of the selected set of farms, or lands, concerned by given policy
shall be an essential argument.
To conclude, the experimental studies show that the ambient tax is a promising
policy instrument although it should still be improved. Possible improvements are the
ones already suggested in the previous subsection, that is, introducing the opportunity
for polluters to reveal at least part of their individual emissions, and taking advantage
of reputation eﬀects.
Because the system we propose will also take into account ex post considerations, we
now turn to the compensation aspects of the damages due to muddy ﬂows.
153 Insuring natural disasters
Up to now, we were interested in what should be implemented ex ante to reduce the
risk of muddy ﬂow. But risk management also implies that regulators focus on ex post
claims. Once a muddy ﬂow occurs, it is important to know how the victims are, or
should be, indemniﬁed not only because they are victims and they suﬀer from negative
externalities, but also because the way they are compensated in has a non neglectible
impact on how they behave before the catastrophe. Our reﬂexion is divided in two steps.
First, we explain why natural hazards, and in particular muddy ﬂow risks, cannot be
managed such as standard risks (those related to car driving, to the house, to health,...).
Second, we propose a new way to compensate victims of muddy ﬂow in a given area by
combining the ambient tax with risk mutualization.
3.1 How damages should be compensated?
3.1.1 Correlation and risk transfer
Large risks, which entail technological risks, environmental risks due to anthropic ac-
tivities and, above all, natural catastrophes, display some diﬀerences when compared to
more standard risks (car insurance, house insurance, ...) that make them diﬃcult to be
considered by classical tools of insurance. Indeed through the risk transfer mechanism,
an agent - the insurer - buys a risk from another agent -the insured - at a negative price
- the insurance premium. The former is able to accept many risks and, thus, to play
the role of an insurer for many individuals, if these risks are independent. Independence
means here that neither the severity nor the frequency of the potential damage for one
individual is correlated to the damage or to the frequency of another one, so that the
insurance premia paid by some individuals may cover the indemnities paid to others at
a given date. This is no longer the case when dealing with large risks since all individ-
uals in a same area face similar risks and will, in the case of an accident, present their
claims simultaneously to the insurer. In such a context, the ﬁnancial situation of the
insurer may be deteriorated and, in some cases, he may be pushed into bankruptcy. To
16correlation (or dependance) one must add the fact that consequences of a damage may
be huge for Society. Lastly, because of their low frequency (compared to other risks),
insurers do not always have suﬃcient statistics to well deﬁne the risk and to estimate a
fair insurance premium. Moreover, they do not have perfect and complete information
about the behaviors of the insured persons and in some cases, in particular for muddy
ﬂows, the behavior in terms of self-protection (respectively prevention) aﬀects the level
(respectively the probability) of a loss11.
3.1.2 Mutualization and the law of large numbers
Concerning natural hazards, correlation is one of the most important issues that insurers
have to deal with because the well-known mutuality principle (which is the second impor-
tant principle in insurance economics) becomes diﬃcult to be applied in such a context.
Indeed, risk mutualization means that risks from a given sector or a given group are
gathered together and that a percentage of the agregate risk (equal to the sum of all
individual risks) is redistributed to each individual within the group. This percentage
does not depend on the initial individual risk, but rather on the attitude towards risks
of the concerned agent. Moreover, when individual risks are independent (such as in
car insurance, house insurance, health insurance), the agregate risk may be very small,
even zero, if the number of individuals is suﬃciently large in the group. The law of large
numbers induces, ﬁnally, a decrease in the variance of the agregate risk: it tends towards
zero (See the appendix for a simple demonstration).
This property does no longer hold if risks are dependent each others. To the variance,
o n em u s ta d dt h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xa n d ,i nt h ec a s eo fn a t u r a lr i s k s ,i n d i v i d u a lr i s k s
present some positive covariance. Hence, the law of large numbers does no longer work
here and the agregate risk remains a random variable. But, the aggregate risk could be
11Prevention deals with activities carried out by the agent in order to reduce the probability of damage
(like driving carefully for car risks or buying one’s house in a non liable to ﬂooding area), while self-
protection is relative to activities that induce a decrease in the level of damage if any (like fastening
one’s seatbelt, or building a wall around one’s property).
17mitigate by inﬂuencing the actions of the agents that aﬀect either the probability or the
level of the potential damage. In the case of muddy ﬂow, farmers are able to aﬀect the
frequency12 (e.g. by adopting the no tillage practice), while inhabitants might reduce
the level of damage if any (e.g. by avoiding ﬁtting out the basement).
Nevertheless, it is still possible, and useful, to consider the mutuality principle for
r i s k st h a tp r e s e n ts o m ed e g r e eo fc o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nt h e m ,b u ti ts h o u l db ea s s o c i a t e d
to the other important principle in insurance, that means the transfer principle. We
propose to discuss this combination in the case of muddy ﬂow risks.
3.2 Implementing a compensation fund for the coverage of muddy
ﬂow damages
Compensation funds have been implemented since many years in some industrial sectors
in order to compensate victims in the case of an incident due to the concerned activity.
One of the oldest known funds is the one built by shipowners in the 1750’s in order to
insure themselves against the loss of their cargo (because of storms, pirats, ...). They
gathered their risks, paid a regular contribution to the pool and, each time a cargo was
lost or wrecked, its owner was compensated (at least partially) by the fund thanks to
the premia initially collected.
The important and interesting points of the mutuality principle (applied in its sim-
plest design by the shipowner) are twice. First, the premium paid by each contributor
does not depend on his individual level of risk, but on the agregate risk (and his atti-
tude towards risk), allowing individuals with high risks to be covered. Second, everyone
within the pool has access to the same coverage characteristic, at a given paid premium.
Hence this principle may induce eﬃcient risk-spreading over the members of the pool.
These interesting arguments can be used in the muddy ﬂow issue. Indeed, the ambient
tax paid by the farmers does not depend on their individual risks, that is the risk relative
to their own exploitation and to which people are exposed. The ambient tax depends on
12This does not exclude the fact that their risk-reducing activities may also aﬀect the level of damage.
18the agregate level of risk. If all risks of farmers in a same area (which has to be deﬁned)
are gathered within a pool, the ambient tax can be considered such as a premium paid
by each farmer to the fund.
Nevertheless, there is a main diﬀerence between this system and the one related to
t h es h i p o w n e r s .I nt h ec a s eo fm u d d yﬂows, farmers pay a contribution to the pool in
order to make available some funds for compensating people that are not members of
the fund (the inhabitants of the area). This is in line with the polluter-pay principle
since individuals whose activities drive some negative externalities13 should participate
in the rehabilitation of the damaged sites and in the compensation programme even if
they do not suﬀer directly from the damage14. Moreover, it is also close to the double
dividend conjecture presented in the introduction: in our setting, the ambient tax is
entirely redistributed to the agents of the area concerned by the compensation fund.
3.2.1 Aggregate risk and individual revelations
In the previous section, we suggested to mix the ambient tax scheme with a revelation
process, through which the agents could avoid paying the ambient tax by revealing their
good practices. Actually, this revelation process might weaken the mutuality principle
because farmers would have the possibility to pay a contribution that depends on their
individual characteristics. Indeed the ambient tax is lowered if the farmer shows that
he has adopted some environmentally friendly practices. Nevertheless, we know that,
besides the risk management itself, decisionmakers have also to cope with the social ac-
ceptability issue. Even if an instrument is eﬃcient from an economic and environmental
13Such characteristics are also observed for other funds related to large risks. See for instance Schmitt
and Spaeter (2005a, 2005b) for oil spill risks and Smets (1992) about compensation funds.
14This is not really the case with muddy ﬂows since the patrimonial value of the land decreases as
sediments are lessiviated. But even so, our arguments hold. Hence another important question that will
arise in such a system deals with the oppportunity of t h ef a r m e rt ob ea l s oc o n s i d e r e da sav i c t i m .T h i s
possibility, even if not unfair from a practical point of view, creates some informational issues (moral
hazard, adverse selection) adressed by the agency theory in economics and is not considered in this
paper.
19point of view, its implementation could induce more costs than the created beneﬁts if
individuals are reluctant to use it or try to ﬁnd some solutions in order to escape from
its application. Thus, in the case of muddy ﬂow and agricultural practices, a suitable
economic instrument should involve a parameter that captures the acceptability dimen-
sion. In our model, this parameter may be the sensitivity of the ambient tax to the
individual revelations: In the limit and unrealistic case of complete social acceptability
of the ambient tax, individual revelations of the agents would not impact the level of the
t a xt h e yp a y .O n l yad e c r e a s eo ft h ea g g r e g a t er i s ks u ﬀered by the whole area can make
it decrease.
Now let us have a look on the behavior of the potential victims. From the economic
literature on risk and insurance, we know that the optimal behavior for an insured
agent is to decrease preventive and self-protective activities as insurance increases if his
insurance premium is not linked to his preventive investments (Becker, 1968). This is
especially the case if the insurer cannot observe the level of prevention or if audit of the
agent’s behaviour is too costly. Nevertheless, in the case of muddy ﬂow, auto-protection
consists in some measures that can be–at least partially–observed after a damage.
Indeed forbidding the amenagement of the underground in a house could be one of these
measures imposed by the insurer. It is also possible to give the agents incentives, such as
for the farmers, to reveal their self-protective measures to the insurer before a damage
occurs. In such a way, compensation of victims might depend upon their protection
measures and this would give them incentives to make the adequate investment because
of the threat of not being well indemniﬁed15. The inhabitants should also contribute to
the fund, but less than the farmers. Indeed, to be incentive the insurance service must
be costly for them: And the insurance premia paid by the insured inhabitants could be
added to the ambient tax, thereby increasing the available funds in the case of a muddy
15In the United States, insurance contracts for natural hazards are underwritten in two steps. First,
a basic contract is signed with some limited coverage. Then the agent invests in preventive measures
and brings this information to the insurer. In the second stage, the contract is renegociated and the
insured person has access to better compensation conditions.
20ﬂow.
Finally, such a system that creates a link between indemnities and the ex ante behav-
iors of victims might also give rise to the emergence of a reputational eﬀect for potential
victims. They might suﬀer from bad reputation if they used to have large claims while
the mean value of damages in the area, or in the village, is decreasing. Up to now, only
farmers where considered as agents being able to suﬀer from bad reputation.
3.2.2 About the optimal scale
Until now, we discussed the limits and, above all, the advantages of implementing a
compensation fund in a given area. A complementary question concerns the size of this
area. It is important to realize that the mutuality principle must deal with approximately
similar risks in order to be as eﬃcient as possible (low risk-persons are not willing to
gather their risks with high-risk persons). Thus it would be unrealistic to think about a
national fund, supplied by diﬀerent ambient taxes, evaluated in diﬀerent regions. Even
the region (Alsace, Haute Normandie, in the French sense) is not a good scale because
of the diversity in the crops, but also in the climatic conditions and, above all, because
of the pedological and agronomic characteristics of the soils. Hence the right scale might
be the village, some area of the village, or two neighbouring villages, depending on their
characteristics. For the particular case of the south of Alsace, the question of the scale
of the area might ﬁnd some insights in Auzet, Heitz, Armand, Guyonnet, and Moquet
(2005). They worked on the natural catastrophes ﬁles of claimants and they obtained
some useful data about the frequency of muddy ﬂow, the level of damages, the nature
of the damages, and others. Such ﬁles exist in France because a decree asserting the
natural disaster state must be published to make funds speciﬁcally dedicated to natural
catastrophes available from the insurers. Thus each village has to prepare documents
about its damages for the local public authority. Coupled with informations on physical
components of the muddy ﬂow object (Armand, 2005), the work of Auzet et al. (2005)
should make possible to build a map describing the vulnerable areas. The work in
progress deals with risk perception and this map will be complemented by informations
21about how the inhabitants and the farmers perceive the risk in their area. This is
especially important when focusing on the type of policy that should be implemented.
Social acceptability, sensitivity to risks, level of knowledge, ..., are important factors in
addition to pure economic ones.
4 Concluding discussion
All the arguments presented in this paper should induce at least one certainty: the ideal
system that will give suﬃcient incentives to the farmers to change their practices and
will induce more preventive behaviors from the citizens in the risky areas is not a system
that uses only one economic tool, even if such a tool is eﬃcient from the theoretical
point of view (i.e. the ambient tax). We showed that several speciﬁcities interact in the
muddy ﬂow issue. This gives rise to some complexity but adds also some dimensions to
the problem that can be exploited to solve it (at least partially).
For instance, farmers usually know their neighbours and communicate with them.
From a theoretical point of view, this could lead to collusive behaviours, which fragilizes
the equilibrium obtained without communication, and thus decreases the eﬃciency of
the economic device. Nevertheless, the very fact that agents know each others in a given
area might be used to create some reputational eﬀects. Hence a given farmer might be
willing to invest in new practices not only for direct ﬁnancial reasons (due to subsidies
for instance or taxes) but also because he might suﬀer from bad reputation eﬀects or
beneﬁt from good reputation eﬀects. This is particularly interesting if his behaviour
aﬀects the level of tax paid by the others, such as for the ambient tax. In the same
spirit, an inhabitant who does not invest in prevention, while his neighbours adopt some
safety measures in order to protect their house, may also suﬀer from bad reputation and
even from a decrease in the compensation if a damage occurs.
The system that we discussed in the paper takes advantage of these eﬀects. It com-
bines the beneﬁcial aspects of taxes (double dividend eﬀect) and of individual revelations
and it solves, at least partially, the issue of asymmetric informations by using an ambient
22tax rather than a pigouvien one.
Moreover, one originality of our approach deals with the fact that we do not separate
the ex ante issue (prevention) from the ex post one (compensation). Taxes and premia
collected ex ante are used for compensation if a disaster occurs. Lastly, the contracts
are written in such a way that they give the agents incentives to invest in self-protective
and preventive measures.
Some points remain questionnable.
In France, catastrophe insurance is compulsory, avoiding thus the Good Samaritan
problem. Indeed the house-insurance premium of each homeowner is charged by a given
percentage in order to ﬁnance natural hazard coverage. By this strategy, the government
protects itself against the possibility that some people be not insured because they know
that the State will compensate them in the case of a natural disaster. In the meantime,
since the French compensation premium is only based on the monetary value of the
agent’s house (thus, indirectly on his income) and not on his own risk, it yields no
incentives to be prudent. In doing so, it gives some importance to equity rather than
to eﬃciency. In Germany, the system is radically diﬀerent. Insurance is comprehensive
and the premia depend entirely on the risk borne by the agent: the system is eﬃcient
from a theoretical point of view, but many people decide not to insure themselves.
They usually underevaluate their risk and, as a direct consequence, refuse to pay the
insurance premium asked by insurers. These pratical cases enhance the fact that the
type of insurance, compulsory or comprehensive, has also an eﬀect on the behaviour of
the agents.
Closely related to this point is the question of what should be put in the insurance
premium. An economist would say that the price of a good or a service must reﬂect its
value. If there is some uncertainty of this value, because it depends on the realization
of a random event, then the price should reﬂect the expected value of the good plus the
risk it contains. In our setting, the service is an action of coverage conditioned by the
level of a damage. The expected value of the damage should then be the important part
23of the premium. Nevertheless, this means also that high premia will be attached to high
risks. Since the individual does not control natural hazards, it seems unfair to make
depend the premium exclusively on the risk.
Actually, the premium should depend simultaneously on the individual risk and on
the income of the agent. In the simplest case, it could be a weighted sum of both and
the government could decide the weights to give to each component, depending on its
goals. If the main objective is to create some strong incentives to invest in prevention,
then a large weight should be given to eﬃciency, that means to the risk component in
the premium. On the contrary, if the goal of the government is to permit each individual
to have access to coverage whatever the area he is living in, then a large weight should
be given to the level of income in the premium. A policy that mixes eﬃciency and equity
will provide some fair weights for the risk and for the income argument.
Lastly, one should discuss about the possibility of implementing an audit policy.
Indeed, we suggest in our setting that farmers could reveal their practices if doing so
allows them to pay a lower (ambient) tax. Symmetrically, inhabitants that invest in
preventive measures should be able to announce these investments to their insurer or to
the Fund manager in order to beneﬁt from a reduction in the insurance premium. Those
informations could also be disclosed thanks to audit. By doing so, not the agent but
the regulator will have an active role to play since he will have to seek the information.
Such a system could be more costly, but it has the advantage to avoid some fraudulent
declarations. The eﬃciency of a system with direct revelations compared to an audit
policy will surely depend on the audit cost, but also on its ability in obtaining information
and on the motivations of the agents to ﬁght against muddy ﬂows.
APPENDIX
Risk mutualization
Let e xi be the individual risk of Agent i with support (xi1,....,xiS;p1,...,p S) where
the second subscript of x d e n o t e st h es t a t eo fn a t u r e( t h e r ea r eS possible states of
24nature in our example) and pj,j=1 ...S, is the probability of realization of state j.T h e
variance of the risk e xi is denoted Va r(e xi),w i t h0 <Va r (e xi) < +∞. Assume now that
there are N agents in our group with independent individual risks: e xi,i=1 ...N,w i t h
same distribution and same expected value. Thus all individual risks have the same
variance, which we denote V . The agregate risk of the pool is deﬁned as f X =
N P
i=1
e xi.
Finally, assume for the sake of simplicity, that each agent becomes a proportion 1/N of
t h ea g r e g a t er i s k .T h ev a r i a n c eo ft h er i s kt h a tt h e yb e a rin ﬁne is
Va r(
1
N
f X)=
1
N2Va r(f X)
=
1
N2Va r(
N X
i=1
e xi)
=
1
N2
N X
i=1
Va r(e xi)
=
1
N2.NV ar(e xi)
=
1
N
.V
The third equality comes from the indepency of the individual risks. Finally, the
variance of f X/N tends towards zero as N tends towards inﬁnity.
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